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Digest: Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi
Alicia Jessop

Opinion by Werdegar, J., expressing the unanimous view of the Court.
Issues
(1) Does the Talent Agencies Act, 1 which prohibits the solicitation or
procurement of employment for actors and actresses, apply to personal
managers as well as talent agents?
(2) If so, does the doctrine of severability apply to manager talent
contracts to allow partial enforcement when a manager has engaged in
unlawful solicitation or procurement under the Act?
Facts
In 1998, Marathon Entertainment, Inc. and actress, Rosa Blasi entered
into a contract for Marathon to act as her personal manager. 2 Blasi agreed
to pay Marathon a fifteen percent commission from her earnings from
employment obtained during the course of the contract. 3 Blasi appeared in
a film and independently procured an appearance on a popular television
show. 4 Blasi allegedly reneged on her agreement to pay the commission
she obtained from the show. 5 She terminated her agreement and replaced
Marathon with her licensed talent agent as her personal manager. 6
Marathon sued Blasi for breach of oral contract, quantum meruit, false
promise, and unfair business practice, seeking to recover unpaid
commissions from the employment it had obtained for her. 7 After
obtaining a stay of the action, Blasi filed a petition with the Labor
Commissioner alleging that Marathon had violated the Talent Agencies Act
(the "Act") by soliciting and procuring employment for her without a talent
agency license. 8 The Labor Commissioner agreed, voiding her agreement
with Marathon and barring it from recovery. 9

I CAL. LAB. CODE§§ 1700-1700.47.
Marathon Entm't, Inc. v Blasi, 174 P.3d 741,744 (Cal. 2008).
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Marathon appealed the Labor Commissioner's ruling to the superior
court for a trial de novo and amended its complaint and challenged the Act
as a violation of a manager's state and federal constitutional rights. 10 The
trial court granted Blasi's motion for summary judgment. 11
The Court of Appeal reversed in part. 12 The court found that, while
the Act applied to personal managers, the obligation to pay the commission
to Marathon for the television show could be severed from any unlawful
portion of the parties' agreement because the agreement had the lawful
purpose of providing services unregulated by the Act. 13 The California
Supreme Court granted review. 14
Analysis
I. The Applicability of the Talent Agencies Act to Managers
The Court first noted that the line between talent agents, who
negotiate contracts for artists, and managers, who provide a broader range
of services, is "often blurred and sometimes crossed." 15 The Act, in
coordination with guild regulation, strictly applies to talent agents but not
necessarily personal managers. 16 The Legislature abandoned the creation
of a licensing scheme applicable to personal managers. 17
The Act requires anyone who solicits or procures employment for
artists to have a talent agency license. 18 To solidify this requirement, the
Act sets forth requirements for how licensed talent agencies run their
business. 19 The Act has a safe harbor provision for managers to solicit or
procure employment if they do so in coordination with a licensed agent. 20
The central concern of the Act is to prevent exploitation of artists by their
representatives. 21
The Court began its analysis with the relevant language of Section
1700.5 of the Act: "No person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of
a talent agency without first procuring a license therefore from the Labor
Commissioner."22 The Court noted that the Act defines "person" as "any
individual, company, society, firm, partnership, association, corporation,
limited liability company, manager, or their agents or employees ..'m The
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Act defines "talent agency" as "a person or corporation who engages in the
occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure
employment or engagements for an artist or artists." 24
The Court reasoned that the Act regulates the conduct of procuring or
soliciting and not the title of the business. 25 Thus, the Court stated, "[a]ny
person who procures employment-any individual, any corporation, any
manager-is a talent agency subject to regulation." 26 The Court stated that,
under the Labor Commissioner's decisions, to any extent that a personal
manager solicits or procures employment--even on an incidental or
occasional basis-the manager must be licensed under the Act. 27
2. The Applicability of Severability to Manager Talent Contracts
The Court first noted that, while the Act is silent on the proper remedy
for illegal procurement, the Act was not in conflict with Civil Code section
1599, which sets forth the doctrine of severability. 28 The Court found that
the Labor Commissioner and Court of Appeal decisions recognized that the
severability doctrine may apply to disputes under the Act. 29 The Court
reasoned that courts must consider the main purposes of the agreement; "if
they determine in a given instance that the parties intended for the
representative to function as an unlicensed talent agency or that the
representative engaged in substantial procurement activities that are
inseparable from managerial services, they may void the entire contract. " 30
The Court stated that the doctrine was equitable and fact-specific and
deferred to the discretion of the Labor Commissioner or the courts to
determine whether it was applicable. 31
Holding
The Court held that ( 1) the Act applies to managers as well as agents;
(2) the Labor Commissioner has the authority to void manager-talent
contracts for unlawful procurement or to apply the doctrine of severability
to partially enforce them; and (3) a genuine dispute of material fact existed
over whether severability might apply to allow partial enforcement of the
parties' contract. 32
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Legal Significance
As a result of this case, unlicensed talent managers in Hollywood must
beware that they will not be compensated for their acts of procurement or
solicitation of the talent they represent without a talent agency license.
They may rest assured, however, that individual and isolated acts of
solicitation or procurement will not void the entire agreement, as these acts
may be severed from the rest of the agreement. The doctrine is fact
specific and thus, the Labor Commissioner may opt not to apply it when it
appears as though a manager has assumed the role of an agent.

